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Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 
Agata Fijalkowski 
‘Do you want to remember, or to forget?’1 
 
Definition and key components (truth/reconciliation/commission) 
How can we define a truth and reconciliation commission? The three main elements of truth, 
reconciliation and commission carry broad responsibilities and expectations. In her study on 
truth commissions, Hayner notes: 
A truth commission (1) is focused on the past, rather than ongoing events; (2) 
investigates a pattern of events that took place over a period of time; (3) engages 
directly and broadly with the affected population, gathering information on their 
experiences; (4) is a temporary body, with the aim of concluding a final report; and 
(5) is officially authorised or empowered by the state under review.2 
 
As we shall see, as Hayner rightly suggests, it is vital not to define truth and reconciliations 
commissions too narrowly. It is also immediately apparent that a commission is distinct from 
a governmental human rights body or from a judicial commission of inquiry. In fact, truth 
commissions have been created under many names. A brief historical overview is needed 
before going on to the purpose of these bodies. A better understanding of the key components 
will arise when a closer look is taken at the criteria needed for a commission’s actual 
operation. This chapter will focus on key questions concerning their work and refer to 
important examples throughout the discussion. 
 
Brief historical overview 
The first truth commission was established in Argentina in 1981. It was known as the 
                                                        
1 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth 
Commissions (Routledge, 2nd ed, 2011) 1.  
2 Ibid, 11-12. 
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National Commission on the Disappeared (CONADEP). The term, ‘truth commission’, would 
emerge later. CONADEP was created in response to the individuals who disappeared 
following an intense and brutal government campaign against subversives. When the military 
forces seized power in 1976, the communists became the main targets for elimination, 
resulting in some 10,000 to 30,000 people arrested, tortured, and killed. The bodies were 
disposed of with the purpose of never being found. As a result, families were in anguish at not 
knowing the fate of the victims. Before acquiescing to popular elections (as discussed in the 
chapter on ‘Amnesty’) and a return to civilian rule, the military granted themselves immunity 
from prosecution and also promulgated a decree ordering the destruction of all documents 
concerning this violent government campaign of disappearance.  
 CONADEP was created under Raúl Alfonsín’s presidency (1983-1989). President 
Alfosín carefully selected the ten members of the commission, which was, after an initial 
resistance, assisted by non-governmental organisations (NGOs). CONADEP would receive 
no cooperation from the Argentine armed forces. In terms of its operation, the Commission 
held no public hearings. The Commission’s profile, however, was very public, in the sense 
that the Commission’s existence and function were known to most people and were widely 
discussed in the social media. CONADEP collected 7,000 statements over a nine-month 
period, and documented 8,960 individuals who had disappeared. Importantly, among those 
interviewed were 1,500 persons who could provide details about the conditions of detention 
and methods of torture, which aided the commission in identifying the detention centres. 
Some 365 torture centres were uncovered.3 
 When the commission released a full report, Nunca Más (Never Again), to the 
president, it was a top seller and a publication that was in demand.4 Parts of the report 
contained critical information that was presented to the prosecution, which was key to the 
                                                        
3 Ibid, 46. 
4 Nunca Más, Report of the Argentine Commission on the Disappeared (Farrar, Straus & 
Giroux, 1986) and Emilio Crenzel,  ‘Argentina’s National Commission on the Disappearance 
of Persons: Contributions to Transitional Justice’ (2008) 2 International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 173-191. 
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trial of several of the military juntas – indeed, five were successfully charged and imprisoned. 
However, the prosecution’s momentum was short-lived; even those convicted were pardoned 
by incoming president Carlos Menem.5 In 1995 information was provided by one of the key 
perpetrators involved in death flights, where detainees were drugged and dropped from 
airplanes into the sea. Also that year, the commander-in-chief of the army publicly 
acknowledged the crimes of the Dirty War. In 1998, criminal trials began for cases of 
kidnapping (these were excluded from amnesty).6 In 1999 full investigations were carried out 
to identify, publicly, individuals responsible, before applying for amnesty. In 2001 the highest 
court held the amnesty provisions unconstitutional. In 2003, the Argentine parliament, 
supported by political will, overturned the amnesties with retroactive effect. By 2009 1,400 
individuals were charged for crimes of the Dirty War7 and 68 per cent were convicted by 
2011.8 Thus, it can be said that Argentina arguably paved the way for such commissions.  
 The next important example is Chile. Here we see ‘truth commission’ appear as part 
of the name of the body itself: National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation. The 
military coup in Chile in September 1973 characterised 17 years of dictatorial rule under 
General Augusto Pinochet. During this time, independent organisations challenged almost 
every case of illegal detention or disappearance in court. The national courts rarely supported 
claims against the regime’s actions. Yet the work of the independent organisations was 
invaluable, as they kept clear records of the individuals detained or disappeared. Despite the 
repressive rule it is important to note that Pinochet was a popular figure in a conservative, 
right wing Chilean society. The changes Pinochet made before civilian rule took over are 
discussed in the chapter on ‘Amnesty’. These changes constrained the leadership of civilian 
rule. Yet President Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) set up a National Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission that comprised eight members, four of whom were supporters of Pinochet. The 
                                                        
5 Priscilla B. Hayner, above n 1, 46.  
6 Ibid, 47. 
7 Dirty War refers to the campaign by the Argentine government against suspected dissidents 
and subversives. 
8 Priscilla B. Hayner, above n 1, 47. 
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Commission’s mandate was to investigate ‘disappearances after arrest, executions, torture 
leading to death committed by government or people in their service, as well as kidnappings 
and attempts on the life of persons carried out by private citizens for political reasons’.9 The 
mandate, however, did not include cases of torture that did not result in death. The practices 
of torture were described in some detail in the Commission’s report but only after the setup of 
a second commission in 2003 was there a specific focus on torture survivors. 
 The 1990 Commission only had nine months to conclude its findings. During that 
time the Commission was able to conduct more thorough investigations of its small number 
of cases, using the invaluable work of independent organisations. It was focused on 
developing as complete picture as possible as to the violations of human rights that occurred. 
It had no power to subpoena and it received little cooperation from the armed forces. When 
the report was released in 1991, its 1,800 pages provided a powerful indictment against the 
Pinochet regime. The report confirmed that 95 per cent of the violations were ascribed to state 
agents and four per cent to leftist groups. In the aftermath of its release, President Aylwin 
asked for forgiveness from the victims and emphasised the need for forgiveness and 
reconciliation, asking the armed forces to recognise the victims’ plight. In response, Pinochet 
responded with a detailed expression of disagreement with the Commission’s report. The 
report was not as widely publicised as the Argentinian one. Any discussions about 
reconciliation petered out. It was not until Pinochet’s arrest in London in 1998 that the issue 
of past human rights violations could be discussed openly and widely.10 The Spanish judge 
requesting Pinochet’s extradition used the commission’s report, while the national 
prosecuting authorities used the report in building their cases.11 
  
                                                        
9 Decree Establishing the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, Supreme Decree 
No. 355, Chile (25 April 1990), reprinted in Neil J. Kritz (ed) Transitional Justice: How 
Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes (US Institute of Peace, vol 3, 1995) 
102. 
10 See, for example, David Sugarman, ‘The Pinochet Case: International Criminal Justice in 
Gothic Style’ (2001) 2 Modern Law Review 933. 
11 By end of 2009 779 former officials were charged with human rights crimes. Over 200 




A truth commission is a specific category for dealing with the past. Although meant to be 
independent, they can have an uneasy relationship with the law, in particular with criminal 
justice. There are several important questions about operations and management that 
determine a commission’s competence and ultimately its effectiveness. 
 Many commissions have been created by presidential decree. The executive selects 
its members and sets the commission’s mandate. The classic examples are that of Argentina 
and Chile. One argument for this way of establishing a commission is that it is less time 
consuming than relying on parliament to pass the relevant legislation. Ideally a commission 
should see public engagement and debate as part of the transitioning process and ownership. 
This latter element refers to individual or collective ownership over the process of revisiting 
the past; it is also about being involved in how this past (or predecessor state’s history) should 
form part of the transitioning state’s future. Examples of commissions set up through 
presidential actions are Argentina, Chad, Chile, Haiti, Sri Lanka and Uganda. With the 
exception of Argentina and Chile, where the civilian presidents took advantage of public 
support, the remainder of examples had little public debate on the commission’s terms.  
 Other truth commissions are created through peace accord. One important example is 
Sierra Leone, discussed later in this chapter. Other examples include El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Kenya. The El Salvadorian and Guatemalan 
commissions were administered by a UN Office and had members appointed by the UN, but 
did not operate as UN bodies per se. For example, in terms of identity, the Guatemalan 
commission was ‘located in a no man’s land between domestic and international law’.12 In 
most cases the terms of agreement were outlined in the national legislation.  
 Many commissions suffer from weak management. The head of the commission is an 
important post and one that should be headed by a respected and impartial individual. The 
                                                        
12 ‘Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights 
Violations and Acts of Violence that Have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer’ UN 
Doc A/48/954/S/1994/751, Annex II (23 June 1994). 
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selection of the members of the commission is an underappreciated process. In many cases 
the selection of members has been done too hastily, and with little consultation. One of the 
best examples of a strong commission, based on their independence and knowledge, is in 
Ecuador, where a number of commissioners came from non-governmental organisations, in 
order to ensure that human rights activists worked with military representatives on the 
commissions.13 In Guatemala, members were selected from a list proposed by presidents of 
national universities.14 
 Commissions can be international, in both commission members and staff. In El 
Salvador, for example, the three commissioners and 25 staff members were all foreign.15 As 
noted above, the commission was set up under UN administration. The Commission tried to 
avoid hiring anyone with previous experience of working on El Salvadoran human rights 
issues, as such familiarity might have suggested a bias that could have affected the neutrality 
of the commission. Importantly, most El Salvadorans agreed that an El Salvadoran-staffed 
truth commission was not possible. They insisted that there were no El Salvadorans with the 
authority and political neutrality needed for the job. It was unlikely that a national 
commission would have been able to function otherwise. Witnesses would have perhaps been 
intimidated into giving testimony to fellow El Salvadorans because of their inability to trust 
the confidentiality of the process. This was evidenced in event that transpired after the 
creation of the follow-up commission looking into death squads.16 The commission 
recommended the removal of members of the armed forces from their positions as a result of 
human rights abuses. In addition, the confidential report recommended that over a hundred 
persons should be removed from the service. The members of the Commission received death 
threats, and two of the three left the country. 
 Other truth commissions have created a mixed model of national and international 
                                                        
13 Priscilla B. Hayner, above n 1, 68-69. 
14 Ibid, 32-35. 
15 Ibid. 
16 For background on the conflict see Martha Doggett Death Foretold: The Jesuit Murders in 
El Salvador (Georgetown University Press, 1993) and Teresa Whitfield, Paying the Price: 
Ignacio Ellacuría and the Murdered Jesuits of El Salvador (Temple University Press, 1995). 
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staff, while some countries exclude foreigners because the situation under investigation is too 
complex for outsiders, or also because the national pool from which to select staff is 
sufficient. Funds are relevant to the kind of commission that is set up. As she shall see below, 
where resources, in the form of individuals with the requisite knowledge as well as the 
physical space, are not available nationally, financial support from an international 
organisation is critical. It does not, however, result in effective results. 
 One of the most important questions about commission work is when should it start. 
A quick start has its advantages. The political momentum and popular support for such an 
initiative are highest at the point of transition, or initial beginning, when a new government 
takes power or an armed conflict has ended. An early start can also hold off for immediate 
reforms and other measures of accountability, providing the government with time to reflect, 
plan, and strengthen institutions integral to the transitional justice initiative. For example, one 
of the main contributions of the Chilean Commission was giving President Aylwin a year of 
grace. In certain contexts, this time is needed, in order to ensure measures are in place for the 
transitional justice mechanism to work. This allowed democratic institutions adequate space 
to work for one year before having to deal with past crimes and human rights violations. As 
noted by some scholars, a quickly created commission can be the ‘centerpiece of a newfound 
peace’ and one that ‘often tests the boundaries of the new regime’ and the willingness of 
authorities to cooperate with an independent investigation.17 
 It is vital to keep the tenure of the truth commission short. Very few are longer than 
two years. Extending the tenure runs the risk of losing momentum, focus, and both political 
and public attention. Outlining a work plan, collecting and organising the documents, 
receiving and processing testimony from thousands of victims, selecting representative cases 
completing investigations and finalising a report in a two-year period is undoubtedly a 
challenge. However it is useful if the report comes out when there is still the momentum of 
transition and reconciliation is a real prospect. This can occur when there are public calls for 
                                                        
17 Priscilla B. Hayner, above n 1, 215. 
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change and a public trust in this transitional justice measure. This way, the recommendations 
made by the commission have a better chance of being implemented. For example, the 
Commission of Inquiry for Uganda was created in 1986. But this Commission was given no 
time limit and, as a result, it concluded its work nine years later.18 By then the public had lost 
interest in the Commission’s work.  
 Most truth commissions base their work on testimonies gathered from thousands of 
victims, witnesses and perpetrators. The findings can be standardised to reveal trends and 
patterns that would otherwise be unknown. If resulting in no fine, imprisonment, or other 
judicially imposed punishment, a truth commission’s findings may negatively affect the 
persons and institutions named as responsible for abuses. To assign responsibility for killings 
or torture to one sector of the military or police might or should have implications for the 
future of the force and the culpability of the commanding officer. Reparations or other 
initiatives will be affected by the commission’s conclusions about who the victims were, 
whether they were apolitical citizens caught up in the repression, or politicised supporters of 
armed rebels, or members of certain ethnic, regional or political groups. The standard of proof 
of past commissions has varied considerably. For example, the El Salvadoran Commission 
created a table setting out standards of proof for its individual findings. The thresholds 
identified levels of overwhelming evidence, or conclusive evidence to support its findings; 
substantial evidence, or very solid evidence to support the commission’s findings; and 
sufficient evidence, or more evidence to support the commission’s findings.19  
 Many truth commissions are established with or after a reparations programme. Even 
when quite substantial, many reparations programmes alone do not generally satisfy the 
victims’ needs for a wider understanding of the events in question. Some individuals 
understandably might feel a lack of respect in the presumption that a cash payment might be 
sufficient in compensating for their pain. The manner in which the programme is carried out 
will help determine how it is received 
                                                        
18 Ibid, 97-99. 
19 Ibid, 222. 
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 In Brazil, the government set up a reparations programme in 1995, a decade after the 
end of military rule. The Commission was to provide approximately $US100,000 to each 
family in some 135 cases of disappearances. (In the case of Velásquez Rodríguez20 the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights awarded a lump sum to the next of kin of the victim or to 
the family.) The Commission also had powers to conduct investigations into these cases, and 
this included exhumations. The result was an acknowledgement of the facts and ‘rescuing 
historical truths and collective memory was deemed by many as the most relevant 
contributions of the process[es]’.21 However, with full disclosure of the truth not forthcoming, 
owing to the lack of political will, there has been continued pressure to establish a follow-up 
commission to fulfil the task that many families are still yearning for – to establish where the 
remains of the disappeared can be found. 
 These two examples point to the complexities underpinning the design of a 
reparations commission – and again a universal design is simply not feasible for the same 
reasons as discussed in relation to truth commissions. 
 
Points of contention and controversy 
The founding terms of reference of the commission’s mandate can range from a detailed 
exposition of competence to a short decree issued by the president. What is most important is 
that this is done in consultation with society, in particular with the victims and victims’ 
families, and human rights organisations. However, as seen below, studies carried out on 
commissions have revealed that there is a lack of engagement with local practices, which 
might explain the later lack of commitment to the implementation and the recommendations 
made by the commission. This has also resulted in calls for a template that could be adopted 
by states that lack the necessary support structures in terms of personnel and resources. The 
point of contention that centres on ownership: commissions should be nationally established, 
unique to that place and reflect a process and involvement of the community. This is further 
                                                        
20 Velásquez Rodríguez, decision from 29 July 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. HR (ser. C) No. 4, (1988). 
21 Priscilla B. Hayner, above n 1, 178. 
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supported by the fact that commissions, for many places, represent the first inclusive process 
of policymaking in the transitioning phase towards democracy, between various segments of 
society.22 
  One of the contentious questions concerns reconciliation itself and what it should 
look like. In her examination of whether reconciliation is beginning to be accepted, Hayner 
suggests three questions. The first question relates to the way that the past is dealt with in the 
public sphere. The key point is whether the people can talk about past conflicts and abuses 
not only with each other but with their former opponents. The second question concerns the 
basis of the relationships between former opponents – if they are based on the past or the 
present. The third question addresses the past or rather, which version of the past is being 
discussed and scrutinised. This is a paramount issue in this field of transitional justice. In the 
context of reconciliation, it means re-establishing relations and reconciling contradictory facts 
and stories. It is this third question that begs further research in this area. Is it possible to 
establish a ‘single universe of comprehensibility’?23 Where conflict and violence have 
returned in cycles over generations, perceptions of the past can vary. This can make 
reconciliation difficult. Yet there is never just one truth. Each of us carries our own version of 
events and our own distinct memories. These may contradict each other. The process of 
disproving certain accounts might lead to an agreed settled account of history. There will be 
some facts that concern the specific crime frame that are basic enough that wide acceptance 
of their truth is necessary before real reconciliation can take place.24 
 From the perspective of victims, there are a few conditions that are favourable and 
others that are necessary before reconciliation can start to become accepted. First, there must 
be an end to the violence or the threat of violence. Secondly, there should be an officially 
                                                        
22 Ibid,178. 
23 Ibid, 189. See Brasil: nunca Maís (Editora Vozes, 1985) and Torture in Brazil: A Shocking 
Report on the Pervasive Use of Torture by Brazilian Military Governments, 1964-1979, trans. 
Jaime Wright (University of Texas Press, 1998). Also Lawrence Weschler, A Miracle, A 
Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers (Penguin, 1990).  
24 Goldstone, Richard J., ‘Justice as a Tool for Peace-Making: Truth Commissions and 




acknowledged recognition of the violent past. This should come from the perpetrators or be 
made by the political leaders. Thirdly, there needs to be projects that bring the community 
together, which enable relationships to be rebuilt. Fourthly, reconciliation should go beyond 
psychological and emotional processes. It also needs to address structural inequalities and 
material needs which, for example, the South Africa Truth Commission Report noted as 
necessary if there was to be any success and hope for national unity. These needs have not 
been adequately addressed in the period following the report.25 Finally, coming to terms with 
the past requires time, and expectations should be adjusted accordingly. 
 What about when a state decides to leave the past alone? Cambodia is known for its 
killing fields of the late 1970s, as is Spain and its mass graves. The Khmer Rouge government 
killed one to two million people, comprising up to one-fifth of the population.26 The manner 
in which Cambodians have chosen to remember has been less clear. 
 When the Khmer Rouge government collapsed in the 1980s, there was an initial 
interest in letting the world know about what happened. But the interest waned, and it was 
reported that Cambodians preferred to forget the past and many did not want to discuss it in 
public. Outside observers stated that among the community there was still some fear of 
talking about the past. Also, the Cambodian and Buddhist faith tradition tended not to 
confront conflict. However, the UN mission to Cambodia listed several reasons for this 
development, the most compelling being that many political, military, and financial elites 
could be implicated and, since many in the current government had at one time been affiliated 
with the Khmer Rouge, it was felt that accommodation was the preferred choice. As a result 
of this ‘hushed’ treatment of the past, the younger generation did not know the history and in 
fact doubted their elders’ accounts of atrocities. Instead there was more focus on the crimes at 
an international level. In 1994 the US passed the Cambodian Genocide Act, which provided 
financial support for the Office of Cambodian Genocide Investigations at the US Department 
                                                        
25 Romi Sigsworth and Nahla Valji, ‘Continuities of Violence against Woman in South 
Africa: The Limitations of Transitional Justice’, in Susanne Buckley-Zistel and Ruth Stanley 
(eds), Gender in Transitional Justice (Palgrave, 2011) 115-135. 
26 Priscilla B. Hayner, above n 1, 204. 
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of State.27 This initiative led to the preservation of documentation that detailed the 
surveillance practices of the Khmer Rouge secret police and the structure of the regime. 
 Some of the Khmer Rouge surrendered in the late 1990s, and suddenly there was a 
desire to prosecute, but at the same time there was fear. People wanted to get on with their 
lives. A UN group of experts recommended a truth commission, but several doubted its 
potential success as many former Khmer Rouge members re-entered Cambodian society. In 
2003, the government and the UN signed an agreement to create a special tribunal, the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. By 2006 it was in operation, with five 
suspects in custody with trials ready to go. While the need to know what happened seemed to 
be strong among Cambodian society, it was felt that the mixed tribunal would not provide the 
truth. In this case the international community has an important role to play, by providing the 
funding and staff to ensure key mechanisms are created and can operate. However, it cannot 
fulfil the needs of a society that is divided, i.e. when there is a fearful silence that has been 
suppressed or where interests are better served by silence or by portions of the truth coming 
out.28  
To meet the challenges of transitional justice, a society should investigate, establish 
and publicly disseminate the truth about past atrocities. The hard truth or forensic truth 
concerns information about the crime and what human rights were violated. There is also the 
emotional truth that refers to knowledge about the psychological and physical impact on the 
victims.29 The rhetoric of political truth makes truth suspicious and exploited. Concrete 
political action to determine what happened is rare. So the way the past is used has a 
significant moral dimension. In other words, the political instrumentalisation of the past needs 
to be overcome.30 It is this politicisation that results in public dissatisfaction and scepticism 
                                                        
27 Ibid, 205. 
28 Priscilla B. Hayner notes a similar experience in Mozambique, above n 1, 297-204. 
29 David A. Crocker, ‘Truth Commissions, Transitional Justice, and Civil Society’ in Robert I. 
Rothberg and Dennis Thompson (eds), Truth v Justice: the Morality of Truth Commissions 
(University of Princeton Press, 2000) 99. 
30 For example, this objective motivates the Regional Committee for Establishing the Facts 
about War Crimes and Other Gross Violations of Human Rights on the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia at <http://www.recom.link> . 
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about justice. The frustration is compounded when the report’s findings do not result in any 
meaningful outcome. 
 
Key examples from Europe and Africa 
One of the most interesting examples of a commission is the Commission of Inquiry for the 
Assessment and Consequences of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) Dictatorship in Germany, 
1992-1994, and the Commission of Inquiry on Overcoming the Consequences of the SED 
Dictatorship in the Process of German Unity, 1995-1998. These German examples show a 
commission that is involved in more of a symbolic mission than a fact-finding one. Although 
the two are separate, one led to the creation of the other. In 1992, the German parliament 
created a Commission to investigate and document the practices of the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR, or East Germany) government from 1949 to 1989. The Socialist Unity Party 
(SED) was the ruling party in the GDR. The structure of the Commission and its operation 
followed the country’s guidelines for parliamentary commissions of inquiry. This meant that 
representation of political parties was equivalent to their representation in parliament as a 
whole. The SED successor, the Democratic Socialist Party, was represented on the 
commission with one member. Experts comprised 11 of the 27 members. 
 The East German regime is discussed differently in the literature, compared to its 
counterparts who were also the subject of commission inquiries. East German dictatorial rule 
physically repressed political opponents and dissidents, controlled freedom of movement and 
imposed organised surveillance on some of its political dissidents. The Commission’s 
mandate went beyond the scope of human rights violations to a wider inquiry into state policy 
and practice, which included an investigation into the structure and practice of the SED 
regime, environmental degradation; political, mental and psychosocial repression; the role of 
ideology in education, literature, and daily life; Church-state relations, judicial independence, 
and relations between West and East Germany.31 
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 Public hearings accompanied the work of the Commission. It should be noted that the 
Commission had no subpoena power; many former government officials who were invited to 
give testimony declined for fear that these would be used against them in court. Importantly, 
the files from the East German secret police, the Staatssicherheit, or Stasi, were made 
available for individual review. The files permitted those who had been victims of Stasi 
informers to confront them directly. This occurred in private or before television cameras. 
The work of the Commission was shaped by this mandate and thus distinct from a 
commission such as South Africa’s. Plus the German Commission preceded the South 
African one. ‘The Commission demonstrates that a victim-centred examination and 
discussion of the past and its legacy is possible without a large-scale testimony collection’.32 
The first inquiry’s report was released in 1995 and was over 15,000 pages. The second 
Commission released its report in 1998. Both arguably helped to frame the highly 
controversial question of how to memorialise this period. 
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission is viewed as being the 
strongest truth commission. Its creation, in 1995, was a response to the apartheid regime, 
which had lasted 45 years.  During this time the African National Congress (ANC) and other 
groups carried out armed resistance against the apartheid state. South Africa had endured 
massacres, killings, torture, lengthy imprisonment of activists, and severe economic and 
social discrimination against its majority non-white population. 
 After Nelson Mandela was elected president in 1994, serious discussions took place 
regarding the creation of a commission. At the heart of the debate was whether to grant 
amnesty to perpetrators of crimes, as insisted upon by the government and military. This 
amnesty would then be linked to the truth commission. Civil society had an important input 
into the creation of the Commission. In mid-1995 parliament passed the Promotion of 
National Unity and Reconciliation Act. Following a public nomination and selection process, 
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17 commissioners were appointed with Archbishop Desmond Tutu as chair. The work 
officially began in 1995, but started in 1996 after some delay in investigations.   
The Commission was given the power to grant individualised amnesty, search 
premises and seize evidence, subpoena witnesses and run a witness protection programme. It 
had a staff of 300 and a budget of $US18 million for the first two and a half years.  
The Commission took testimony from 21,000 victims and witnesses, 2,000 of whom 
also appeared in public hearings.33 Media coverage was widespread, with a special television 
programme devoted to its work. 
The Commission did not always make use of its strong powers. The powers of 
subpoena and search and seizure were applied only a few times. It was criticised by human 
rights organisations for not issuing a subpoena against the minister of human affairs. The 
Commission possibly was afraid of a violent reaction. 
The greatest innovation of the Commission was its ability to grant individualised 
amnesty.34 The period covered by the amnesty was 1960 to April 1994. 7,115 applications for 
amnesty were received. If the crimes concerned gross violations of human rights, the 
applicant was required to appear at a public hearing to answer questions from the 
commission, from legal counsel representing the victims or victims’ families and from the 
victims themselves. Amnesty was granted to those who fully confessed to their involvement 
in past crimes and showed them to be politically motivated. The Amnesty Committee 
considered a number of factors in determining whether the applications satisfied 
requirements. A significant factor was whether the crime was politically motivated. In fact, 
4,500 applications were denied; most of them lacked a political objective. Neither an apology 
nor any sign of remorse was necessary to be granted amnesty, so to avoid inducing fake 
apologies. Of course, some perpetrators showed remorse and apologised. 
There were several high profile trials that resulted in convictions. But when the trial 
of the former minister of defence (Magnua Malan) ended in acquittal it was felt that the threat 
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of prosecution was not strong enough to persuade senior-level perpetrators to take advantage 
of the amnesty process. Several key amnesty decisions should be noted, such as the Stephen 
Biko case, where the admitted killers of the anti-apartheid activist were denied amnesty on 
the grounds that the perpetrators claimed that the death was accidental. Another controversial 
ruling was granting amnesty to 37 ANC leaders who applied jointly. Little details were 
provided. The commission granted the group collective amnesty, a decision that was later 
overturned by the Cape Town High Court on the grounds that they did not make the full 
disclosures as required by the amnesty provisions. The actions were gross human rights 
violations, but no further action has been taken, owing to lack of evidence, despite calls for 
prosecution by former South African police and generals.35 
The Truth Commission did have its powers and decisions challenged in court. The 
decisions showed the dissatisfaction felt by some as regards the amnesty laws. Cassese 
recognised the difficult and sensitive nature of the project during the country’s transitioning.36 
In his analysis of the goals of international criminal justice, he draws our attention to the 
dilemma that amnesty laws present and refers us to the South African Constitutional Court 
case of Azanian Peoples Organization v President of the Republic of South Africa.37 In this 
ruling from 25 July 1995 the Act was upheld and, within that, its amnesty laws. The Court 
saw the Commission as a suitable solution for a country that is transitioning from one of 
terror towards democracy. Cassese makes an important point here regarding the choice to 
establish a commission, which might not be suitable for all transitioning states. He uses the 
example of former Yugoslavia, to indicate that perhaps a commission might not be best suited 
to a transition where, broadly speaking, a socialist democracy transitioning to several 
ethnically-based mini-states that remain antagonistic towards each other. In this vein 
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however, it is worth noting a civic initiative in 2005, namely the Regional Committee for 
Establishing the Facts about War Crimes and Other Gross Violations of Human Rights on the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia was established. Known as RECOM, it continues to be an 
unfinished political project. RECOM does not include truth in its name, but facts, in an effort 
to overcome political instrumentalisation and to counter the political memory of the past.38 
RECOM endeavours to create a space for victims, by frequently referring to victims in its 
fact-finding. Facts can provide that necessary shift whereby victims become subjects with a 
name and story. Facts become meaningful that the victim’s story is heard.39  
Another factor that is discussed in Azanian Peoples concerns the difficulty of 
carrying out prosecutions – due to secrecy and the inability to collect the required proof to 
secure a prosecution. Moreover, in that case the Court asserted that amnesty, under the terms 
of the Act, was not awarded automatically and had to meet strict criteria. Sometimes amnesty 
and truth commissions are preferable to prosecutions, when the domestic system is too fragile 
to accommodate the trials against the threat of political instability.40  
It should be noted that charges were brought against former president of South Africa 
P.W. Botha after he refused to appear before the Commission following a subpoena. The trial 
then became a forum for the commission to present its evidence against him, which included 
his knowledge or approval of a long pattern of state crimes. Botha was convicted and fined 
and given a one year suspended sentence. He successfully appealed to have his conviction 
overturned on a technicality.41 
In another case involving former South African president F.W. de Klerk, the work of 
the Commission was temporarily blocked after de Klerk tried to stop the Commission from 
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naming him in the report. For its part, the ANC also attempted to block the publication of the 
Commission’s report. The ANC was not satisfied with the conclusions drawn about its past 
actions. When the report was formally considered by the parliament, deputy president Thabo 
Mbeki, speaking in his capacity as president of the ANC, announced that the ANC had 
serious reservations about the Commission’s report – noting that its findings seemed to 
delegitimise the ANC’s struggle for liberation. In the end the government did not make any 
commitment to implement the Commission’s recommendations because of these reservations. 
 The impact of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission on 
reconciliation has been the subject of ongoing debate. ‘What remained clear to all, however, 
was that coming to terms with decades of abuses would take longer than a few years, and 
much more than speaking the truth’.42 
 The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and its work give rise to 
similar concerns, as well as other factors that identify other features of the work of a truth 
commission. An agreement for the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission was 
found in the Lomé peace accord that ended the country’s civil war in July 1999. The 
agreement was signed into law through the Truth and Reconciliation Act in February 2000. 
After some delay owing to fighting between the government and rebel fighters, a public 
process was initiated to secure nominations for commissioners. According to the Act, the 
Commission was to undertake research, receive statements, and hold sessions with the aim of 
establishing ‘an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and 
international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone’, from the 
beginning of the conflict in 1991 to January 2002. The Act places special emphasis on victims 
of sexual abuse and on children who were either victims or perpetrators (child soldiers). 
While the Commission was meant to be a fully independent body, it was later decided that it 
would be administratively managed by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR). While the OHCHR assisted with fundraising and administrative support, 
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some questions were raised concerning the Commission’s independence in making 
operational decisions. The operating budget was less than $US5 million; limited finds and a 
strict timeline reduced its scope, the taking of statements, and public hearings. 
 It should be noted that there was strong support for the Commission’s work from 
former combatants. Over 10 per cent of the statements came from perpetrators. The more the 
Commission’s work became publicised, the more support it garnered. In fact, public hearings 
were held across the country, accompanied by ‘reconciliation ceremonies’, where victims and 
perpetrators got together, and went through a ritual ceremony to return and be reaccepted to 
the community. Eventually the work of the Commission overlapped with that of the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, created in 2002 after an agreement between the government and the 
UN. The Court’s mandate was to prosecute those ‘bearing the greatest responsibility’ for 
crimes after November 1996. 
 The Commission published a four-volume report that was concluded in 2004. It 
included a video summary and a child-friendly version. In this way the country hoped to 
escape the dilemma that was common to other commissions – that of the government failing 
to act on the recommendations presented in the final report. The country set out to implement 
the recommendations. A follow-up committee was created, with national and international 
members, which would submit quarterly reports and supervise the plan. But these 
mechanisms were never made operational.  
 There was little commitment shown by the government. Despite slow progress and 
marginal success in the initiatives eventually put in place for women and children, there is 
hope in that the experience has led to important studies about the shortcomings of 
commissions. One of the most valuable is that commissions run counter to local 
understandings about healing and reconciliation, suggesting that such operations might pay 
attention to local practices to overcome obstacles to healing.43 
 Studies have shown that truth telling may affect views on group security over a long-
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term period in post-conflict societies.44 This is especially so in societies divided along cultural 
lines, where truth telling might exert some peace-promoting influence. Of the documented 
truth commissions, most are in Africa, followed by Asia, the Americas and Europe.45 These 
recent studies show that there so much interest in creating new truth commissions because of 
their impact on transforming public discourses on memory, truth, justice and reconciliation. 
These new avenues are created even when the commissions seemingly produce modest 
changes owing to political constraints.46 It is true that the academic scholarship is largely 
based on the better-known commissions. Greater attention from the international human 
rights advocacy community tends to focus on criminal justice. The dominance of this legal 
perspective may be missing the complexities and importance of parallel, non-judicial 
initiatives. Truth commissions directly impact on thousands of victims, and on the possibility 
of criminal justice, reforms, reparations, reconciliation, and community relations. The 
interdisciplinary asset of the field of transitional justice should be used to carry out deeper 
legal analysis of truth commissions. For example what is the link of TRC’s to courts? Or, 
what is the impact on trauma and healing across time and regions? A recent study on the 
Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission reveals some important factors that might 
help explain what underpins the success of a truth commission. 
 The Liberian Commission was created in 2005 further to the 2003 Accra 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement that was concluded to address the country’s legacy of 
human rights violations in the context of its civil wars in the period 1979 to 2003. According 
to Ezekiel Pajibo, ‘Warring parties [in Liberia] agreed to the TRC concept because they 
wanted to prevent the establishment of a war crimes tribunal’.47 One factor that might have 
influenced this position was the arrest in 2003 of Charles Taylor on charges of war crimes and 
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crimes against humanity in Sierra Leone by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 
 The Liberian Commission investigated violations that occurred between January 
1979 and October 2003, marking the period of the final year of the Americo-Liberian rule and 
the inauguration of the National Transitional Government for Liberia.48 The composition of 
the Commission included nine commissioners: three from civil society, two from political 
parties, one from the UN, and one from the Economic Community of Western African 
Societies. Out of nine four women were in the Commission for gender balance. Gender is 
often neglected on the transitional justice process and scholars have argued that transitional 
justice mechanisms require a change in procedures (such as memberships on truth 
commissions) to address this inequality.49 Due to the absence of adequate funding and 
resources the commission did not have the expertise to make a solid legal evaluation of the 
cases. The final report of the Commission was made in 2008, when it was presented to the 
Liberian legislature. It contains four volumes. One of the most unique contributions was the 
Commission’s inclusion of the diaspora community throughout the report. This is the first of 
its kind. The involvement of the community was paramount, as thousands fled the conflict 
creating large communities in West Africa, Europe, and the United States. Their contribution 
included outreach, statement taking, report writing and being present at the public hearings.  
 Another unique contribution of the Commission was the Palava Hut Forum as a 
complementary tool for justice and national reconciliation. This process recommended that 
the process be based on traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. The Palava Hut process 
was used in pre-settler Liberia. It was convened by elders to settle community matters. 
Traditionally a confession was sought for the wrongful deed, followed by an apology for the 
wrong committed, forgiveness from the victim, and cleansing rituals and restitution. This 
sanction was limited to lesser crimes only, and not available for international crimes. 
Significantly, the informal justice system had more support and trust than the formal court 
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system. The Liberian Commission Report also included an investigation of economic crimes, 
as the exploitation of resources was one of the primary causes underpinning the conflict. The 
Report sets out an extensive definition of the crimes, as well as a list of individuals and 
corporations that the commission holds responsible for economic crimes. 
 The Liberian Commission’s work has made an invaluable contribution to the 
mapping of human rights abuses. As part of its mandate it conducted the National Conflict 
Mapping Survey that identified the emerging conflict issues that had the potential to 
undermine the peace process and that would influence the ‘conflict sensitive’ policy 
recommendations it would make. Despite the difficulties, the Liberian Commission succeeded 
in making an original and important contribution to our understanding of transitional justice 
and its many mechanisms. It succeeds in advancing our critique about the role of the law in 
the area, and acknowledging the vital role that non-legal actors and other forms of knowledge 
have to play in the area of reconciliation.50 
 
A short summary 
This chapter has considered the definition of a truth and reconciliation commission and that 
its key components of truth, reconciliation and commission that carry broad plethora of 
responsibilities and expectations. 
The founding terms of reference of the commission’s mandate can range from a 
detailed exposition of competence to a short decree issued by the president. What is most 
important is that this is done in consultation with society, in particular the victims and 
victims’ families, human rights organisations, and key independent actors. However, as seen 
above, studies carried out on commissions have revealed that there is a lack of engagement 
with local practices, which might explain the later lack of commitment to the implementation 
of the recommendations made by the commission. Also, this has resulted in calls for a 
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template that could be adopted by states that lack the support structures. Another 
controversial and highly significant point arises in relation to ownership: commissions should 
be nationally established, unique to that place and reflect a process, which involves the 
community. Commissions, for many places, are the first inclusive process of policymaking in 
the transitioning phase towards democracy, between various segments of society. This begs 
the question of whether a general standard model is even possible. 
Certainly more studies need to be carried out with respect to the commissions that 
have been created, with a view to answering the question of why is there so much interest in 
creating new truth commissions. Academic scholarship is largely based on the better-known 
commissions. On the part of the international human rights advocacy community, criminal 
justice predominates. The dominance of this legal perspective lacks an appreciation of the 
complexities and importance of parallel, non-judicial initiatives.  Truth commissions directly 
impact on thousands of victims, and on the possibility of criminal justice, reforms, 
reparations, reconciliation, and community relations. The interdisciplinary asset of the field of 
transitional justice should be used to carry out deeper legal analysis of truth commissions. For 
example what is the link to courts? Or, what is the impact on trauma and healing across time 
and regions? The contemporary examples of commissions, such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, 
bring us close to such an understanding. 
 
Discussion questions  
Should a truth commission be national, international or a mix? What considerations are 
important to bear in mind? 
When should the work of the commission begin? 
How long should it carry on? 
Should there be a general, universal template to assist in the setting up of a commission? 
What should be done with the commission’s findings (i.e. prosecution)? 
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